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I.

INTRODUCTION

Cutting-edge neuroscience is advancing at an incredible rate.
Technologies like functional magnetic resonance imaging (hereinafter
“fMRI”) are becoming more sophisticated and precise. The maturation
of these technologies has recently provided researchers with a glimpse
1
at the nearly real-time operation of the brain. Most importantly, new
technologies allow for scientific studies of subjects’ brains while the
2
subjects are being exposed to stimuli. This functional view of the brain
permits studies that observe brain function while subjects perform other
actions. For example, researchers can observe the brain while a subject
3
is simultaneously asked questions or shown photographs or videos.
Certain studies using fMRI technology have been intentionally
structured in such a way that the subject will consciously deceive the
4
researcher in response to the researcher’s questioning. These studies

1

See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the real time imaging of the brain that is
provided by fMRI technology.
2
Id.
3
Mark Harris, MRI Lie Detectors, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 2010), http://spectrum.ieee.
org/biomedical/imaging/mri-lie-detectors/ (“To the accompaniment of various clicks and
clacks, a screen above my head flashes a series of questions in front of my eyes.”).
4
See Langleben, infra note 44.
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have begun to correlate the activity of certain parts of the brain with
certain behavior, such as deception. One application of such technology
is the creation of a new lie detector which could take the place of the
polygraph — an instrument that has been largely discredited in the legal
5
field.
Currently, entrepreneurs are marketing the latest lie detection
6
technology. The marketing of such research raises important questions
about whether the state of the science has matured to such a degree that
the company claims are warranted. Most of the legal scholarship on
fMRI technology focuses on the issues that may be impacted by fMRI
7
lie detection. However, little legal attention has been given to the
8
commercial advertisement of the technology. This Note will focus on
the online advertisement of the technology, arguing that both No Lie
MRI and Cephos Corporation are marketing functional neuroimaging in
a manner that violates consumer protection law under the Federal Trade
Act.
Part II of this Note will examine the science behind the nascent
field of fMRI. Part III will then discuss the theoretical applications of
fMRI-based research and the importance of decisive action by the
Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter “FTC”). Part IV will explicate
the FTC’s regulatory framework as it pertains to deceptive advertising.
Part V of the Note will describe the specific claims made by both of the
leading marketers of fMRI lie detection, namely No Lie MRI, Inc. and
Cephos Corp., while Part VI will explain why these companies’ claims
violate the FTC’s consumer protection laws regarding the advertisement
of commercial products. Finally, Part VII will propose solutions that the
FTC should adopt to correct the deceptive advertising.

5

See discussion of polygraph evidence, infra Part II.A.
The two primary companies that have marketed neuroscience technologies are No Lie
MRI, Inc., and Cephos Corporation. See CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com (last
visited Nov. 26, 2010); NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
7
As of September 23, 2010, a LexisNexis search for: fMRI or “functional MRI” within
twenty words of “lie detection” yielded forty-nine results; an impressive result for a narrow
topic within the fledgling field of “neurolaw.”
8
Consumer protection issues appear to have only been raised once, and briefly. See
Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical
Approach, 33 AM. J. L. AND MED. 193, 226 (2007).
6
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THE SCIENCE BEHIND FMRI
A.

The Polygraph’s Alleged Bigger Brother

For decades, the primary device for detecting deception has been
the polygraph. In the legal setting, polygraphs have received negative
treatment from the United States Supreme Court for their limited
9
10
reliability. In United States. v. Scheffer, the Court noted that there is
no agreement among scientists as to the accuracy rate of polygraph
11
tests. The Court’s ruling coincided with the majority of states enacting
12
per se rules against the admissibility of polygraph evidence. However,
the polygraph nevertheless continues to remain pertinent to post13
conviction issues such as probation.
The polygraph’s failure to gain acceptance can largely be attributed
to the physiological responses it measures. The polygraph functions by
measuring physiological responses such as pulse, blood pressure, and
14
galvanic response. One of the more popular means by which to
measure the physiological responses is through asking comparison
15
questions (also known as a comparison question test).” Physiological
responses are evaluated by asking and comparing different types of
questions including any relevant questions (e.g., “Did you commit the
murder on March 4, 2010?”), control questions that do not deal with the
9

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998).
Id.
11
Id.
12
See, e.g., State v. Domicz, 907 A.2d 395, 411 (N.J. 2006) (stating that thirty-one
states currently have a per se rule against polygraph evidence or have not addressed the
issue).
13
For example, the Colorado Department of Public Safety conducted a study that it
claimed demonstrated the polygraph’s ability to spot high-risk behaviors in adult sex
offenders. See KIM ENGLISH ET AL., COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE VALUE OF
POLYGRAPH TESTING IN SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 21 (Dec. 2000), available at
http://dcj.state.co.us/ors/pdf/docs/revisedpolyrpt6.pdf.
14
See also Kati Singel, Origin of the Modern Polygraph, UNIV. OF MARY
WASHINGTON,
http://www.umw.edu/hisa/resources/Student%20Projects/Singel/students.
umw.edu/_ksing2os/polygraph/origin.html (last updated Apr. 10 2005).
15
See COMM. TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, THE NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCIS., THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 74 (2003), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10420&page=R1 [hereinafter POLYGRAPH
REPORT]; William G. Iacono, Effective Policing: Understanding How Polygraph Tests Work
and are Used, Criminal Justice and Behavior, 35 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR 1295,
1295 (2008).
10
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particular event (e.g., “Have you ever taken something that did not
belong to you?”), and irrelevant questions (e.g., “Are you sitting on a
16
chair?”). Deceptive individuals are expected to show heightened
physiological responses to the relevant questions, whereas truthful
individuals are predicted to show the opposite pattern of response; that
is, they will demonstrate a heightened response to the control
17
questions. A pattern of consistently heightened responses to the
relevant questions rather than to the control questions allows the
18
examiner to infer deception.
One of the primary reasons why the legal community has not
embraced the polygraph may be because of the inherent problems
associated with measuring physiological responses, and the lack of
well-developed theoretical models of the physiological processes
19
underlying the peripheral measurements taken by the polygraph.
Physiological responses are, in some sense, removed from the decision
to lie since responses like sweating and pulse are part of the peripheral
nervous system that can be triggered by a variety of stimuli, apart from
the act of engaging in deception. The difficulty with the polygraph test
is that there inherently exists an ambiguity in its findings as to whether
the response is due to deception or other physiological responses that
20
may be associated with truthfulness. Another shortcoming of the
polygraph is the difficulty in applying it outside of the laboratory. In its
investigatory findings, The National Academy of Sciences concluded
that ambiguity associated with the real world examinee population — as
opposed to the laboratory subject population — almost certainly limits
21
accuracy when the polygraph test is applied outside the laboratory.
Neuroimaging machines, on the other hand, are viewed as
providing a more direct measurement of deception because they
measure the physiology of the brain itself, as opposed to the physiology
22
of the peripheral nervous system. Thus, in some sense, neuroimaging
16

Gershon Ben-Shakhar, A Critical Review of Control Question Test (CQT), in
HANDBOOK OF POLYGRAPH TESTING 4 (Murray Kleiner ed., 2002), available at
http://www.openu.ac.il/Personal_sites/Gershon-Ben-Shakhar/CQTCHAP4.pdf.
17
Id. at 4-5.
18
Id. at 5.
19
See POLYGRAPH REPORT, supra note 15, at 93.
20
Id. at 4.
21
Id.
22
See Singel, supra note 14.
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machines like fMRIs seek to go to the “source” of the lie, i.e. to the
brain of the individual where the conscious decision to deceive the
23
examiner presumably took place.
A multitude of recent studies have demonstrated an ability to
identify certain regions of the brain associated with active deception
through fMRI technology. This type of lie detection attempts to uncover
information about what an individual knows by seeking to identify
specific brain patterns that are believed to be more active when an
24
individual engages in conscious deception. The accuracy of predicting
deception currently varies; however, some studies claim to have reached
25
ninety percent accuracy. Two companies—No Lie MRI, Inc.
(hereinafter “No Lie MRI”) and Cephos Corp. (hereinafter “Cephos”)—
have already begun to commercialize and market fMRI technology,
26
allowing people to be scanned in an attempt to prove their innocence.
These companies operate websites touting their ability to detect
deception. Their claims are strong enough that one must ask whether the
advertising of their services constitutes deceptive advertising. The first
step in determining whether there is false advertising is to explain how
fMRI technology operates.
B.

How Does Functional Brain Imaging Work?

fMRI scanning utilizes magnets to detect changes in the levels of
27
oxygenated blood in the brain. Active neurons utilize oxygen and,
therefore, require a greater amount of hemoglobin-rich blood to provide
28
them with the oxygen required to function. Computers can interpret the
difference between the way that deoxygenated blood (i.e. blood that has
been “used” by the brain) and oxygenated hemoglobin (i.e. blood that

23

However, as will be discussed in Part V, fMRI lie detection suffers from the same
difficulties as the polygraph insofar as applying it to individuals outside the laboratory
setting.
24
See Langleben, infra note 44.
25
F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Imaging, 58
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605 (2005). Steven Laken, the chief executive officer of Cephos,
is a co-author of Kozel’s study; therefore, it should be noted that there may be a conflict of
interest.
26
See generally CEPHOS CORP., supra note 6; NO LIE MRI, supra note 6.
27
See David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance Assessment of Brain
Function, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 794, 794-95 (2006).
28
Id.
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has not yet been “used” by the brain) respond to the magnets. This
difference is referred to as the Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent
30
(hereinafter “BOLD”) effect. The underlying assumption is that an
increase in BOLD signifies an increase in blood flow and it is believed
31
to indicate neural activity. fMRI scans are administered while the
person being scanned performs various tasks, such as answering a
question, observing a picture, or hearing a sound. Scans occurring
during these activities reveal the parts of the brain being activated
32
during the specific tasks.
Because of its complexity, many people misunderstand exactly
how fMRI works. Thus, it may be helpful to illustrate the process by
way of an analogy. Imagine a worldwide tsunami warning system that
overlays colors onto a map of the world, with the color of a geographic
location varying in response to the perceived level of threat. To
accomplish this, instruments (seismographs) are used to measure
33
vibrations within the earth. The designers of the system must establish
a threshold level of vibration specifying the point at which a warning
will not register on the map. This threshold is critical: set the threshold
too low and the warning will activate too frequently; set it too high and
it may miss important vibrations. Yet, it is important to understand that
the threshold is in a sense arbitrary, because it is not a natural
phenomenon. After a threshold is set and the map is created, one must
then make the initial inference that the increased vibrations reliably

29

Id.
Id.
31
Id. at 798. Note that there are other technologies that similarly leverage physiological
response to increased neuronal activities. For example, PET and SPECT scanning operate
by recording the distribution of radioactive tracers that are injected into the bloodstream,
ultimately ending up in the brain. These tracers are attached to molecules that the brain will
use, most notably either oxygen or glucose. Therefore, more tracers accumulate in parts of
the brain that are active because active neurons in the brain require blood and glucose for
energy. These technologies as well as magnetoencephalography were in use before the
fMRI. However, neither has been attempted to be adapted as a lie detection device,
presumably because their spatial resolution (i.e. the quality of the data) is lower than that of
fMRI machines. See generally David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance
Assessment of Brain Function, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 794, 794 (2006)
(discussing problems with the spatial and temporal resolution of different imaging
technologies).
32
See infra Part III.C for a discussion of Langleben’s playing card study.
33
See Earthquake Glossary, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV., http://earthquake.usgs.
gov/learn/glossary/?term=seismograph (last visited Dec. 4, 2010).
30
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indicate an increase in activity of the earth’s plates, rather than some
other phenomena, such as a methane gas eruption. With that inference
made, one must make a second inference: that an increase in activity of
the earth’s plates corresponds to an increased likelihood of a tsunami.
Since these inferences occur after looking at the map, the inferences
34
drawn must rely to some extent on the initial threshold vibration level.
Likewise, for regions of the brain to show up as “active” on the
fMRI radiological images (i.e., as colors), the investigator must specify
35
a threshold level of fMRI data that qualifies as the BOLD threshold. In
our tsunami analogy, this would be the threshold level of vibration that
is required for the vibration data to appear on the map as a warning area.
The lower the vibration level required for warnings, the more warnings
that will register on the map. Likewise, with fMRI scanning, the lower
the threshold, the more regions appear as “active” colored regions on
36
the scan. In this sense, an individual analyzing an fMRI image is very
much like the individual looking at the map in that she depends,
whether consciously or not, on the threshold determination when
drawing subsequent inferences about the subject’s physiological or
psychological state.
III. WHY THE FTC SHOULD ACT
The FTC has taken a proactive approach to issues regarding the
advertising of health or medical products. In its Deception Statement,
the FTC concluded that it automatically deems claims or omissions to
be material in advertising if they “ . . . significantly involve health,
safety, or other areas with which the reasonable consumer would be
37
concerned.” However, it is unclear if fMRI-based lie detection will be
viewed as involving health or safety per se. In other words, since fMRI-

34

It is worth noting that, even without the use of a map, the same inferences are
required. That is, a threshold level of activity must be set such that a reading will trigger an
alarm or alert of some kind.
35
See Appendix 1 for an example of an fMRI image.
36
As previously stated, the use of a map is not necessary. As long as the fMRI
companies claim to “verify” the veracity of a given statement, it will be necessary for them
to specify a threshold reading that would allow them to conclude that the subject is lying.
This is an inherent necessity in their claim that they can verify. The problems with these
claims of “truth verification” will be described infra Part IV.B as they pertain to consumer
protection violations.
37
See Deception Statement, infra note 69, at 182.
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based lie detection is not a drug or device that claims to treat illness or
disease, it is unclear whether it falls into the category of health or safety
products that would trigger stricter FTC scrutiny. Nevertheless, the
stakes regarding the advertising of fMRI-based lie detection
technologies could not be higher. One need only look at potential ways
that a bona fide fMRI lie detection device would influence our society
to appreciate the need for the FTC to approach this issue with urgency.
If consumers are allowed to embrace a flawed conception of fMRI
technology based on the advertising of No Lie MRI and Cephos, many
of the issues that would arise with a bona fide lie detector threaten to
materialize here as well.
A.

Multiple Constitutional Issues at Stake

Neuroimaging, whether anatomical or functional in nature, raises
serious concerns about the right to privacy as well as a defendant’s
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
38
seizures and self-incrimination, respectively. Can fMRI studies that
show possible deception be admitted without the consent of the
defendant? Attorney and former professor of biology John New points
out that “an initial question that must be asked is whether results of
brain activity measurement should be considered by the legal system to
39
be physical evidence or actual testimony by the individual.” Treating
fMRI data as physical evidence, as is the custom for DNA or
fingerprints, is an attractive approach given that fMRI data is a physical
40
measurement of a concrete, tangible phenomenon. However, if
classified as physical evidence, the recording of brain activity by way of
neuroimaging could be compelled in criminal cases and used against the
41
accused by the prosecution. On the other hand, if neuroimaging
evidence is considered testimony, then the argument could be made that
any inclusion would violate the defendant’s right against selfincrimination. Regardless, the legal community will have to determine
which strategy best promotes justice.

38
See generally Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006). Polygraph testing has also been subject to
questions as to whether it infringes on an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights.
39
John New, If You Could Read My Mind, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 193 (2008).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 194.
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The powerful constitutional issues discussed above should prompt
the FTC to act swiftly to ensure that those marketing and conducting
what they believe are fMRI lie detectors actually accomplish what they
promise. Arguments can be made that the benefits of an actual fMRIbased lie detector would outweigh these constitutional concerns.
However, it is clear that the benefits of the technology in its current
state do not outweigh these concerns. Allowing current fMRI-based
methods for detecting deception to be marketed as bona fide lie
detection devices could alter the constitutional landscape while
providing little in return.
B.

Government Involvement in fMRI development

fMRI-based lie detection could also change the way that
governments interrogate suspects. United States government agencies,
like the Central Intelligence Agency, are interested in using cutting42
edge neuroscience for interrogation. However, the companies remain
43
quite secretive of their connections to the government. The Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded a widely cited
44
study by University of Pennsylvania neuroscientist Daniel Langleben.
The study is cited on No Lie MRI’s “publications” section of their
45
website. In the study, Langleben presented participants with an
46
envelope containing two playing cards, as well twenty dollars. The
participants were shown a semi-random series of playing card images
displayed on a projector that could be viewed by the participant while
47
being scanned in the fMRI machine. The participants were instructed
42
See Ian Sample & David Adam, The Brain Can’t Lie, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/life/feature/story/0,13026,1088572,00.html (last visited Nov. 26,
2010).
43
In an interview, No Lie MRI’s CEO Joel Huizenga stated that, “We are dealing with
the military. The guys in the field are asking for this technology. They want to know
whether people are telling them the truth or telling them lies.” However, Huizenga “refuses
to provide any specifics, other than saying that No Lie MRI hopes shortly to secure
government funding for a multimillion-dollar, 1200-person study.” Harris, supra note 3.
44
See Daniel D. Langleben, Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast
Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005) (acknowledging that
DARPA provided funding for the study).
45
Press and Publications, NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/pressNPubs/
Publications.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
46
See Langleben, supra note 44, at 263.
47
Id.
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to signify whether the card on the screen was the card they possessed;
however, they were also specifically instructed to deny possession of
48
one of the two cards they possessed when they saw that card projected.
Langleben reported being able to determine whether the individuals
49
were being deceptive based on the fMRI data.
Given the inherent inadequacy of using current fMRI technology
as a device for detecting deception, the FTC should take seriously the
marketing of the technology for such purposes. The government is a
consumer that, though sophisticated, may also need consumer
protection, as it is often the consumer of cutting-edge technology that is
developed or discovered in universities. Moreover, state politicians and
agencies may not be as sophisticated or well-versed in the limitations of
fMRI-based lie detection, and may believe the strong claims that
marketers of the technology put forth on their websites.
C. Powerful Findings Raise Questions for the Criminal Justice
System
fMRI technology also applies to issues outside the scope of lie
detection. In fact, a new area of law has been coined called “neurolaw”
to account for the vast influence that modern neuroscience has had on
50
our legal system. Recent neuroimaging studies have identified a
network of brain regions involved in moral processing that may alter
51
our notions of free will and moral blameworthiness. For example,
researchers at the University of Southern California found that certain
areas of the brain’s cortex were “activated when subjects performed
52
tasks involving moral conundrums.” Other neuroimaging studies have
found that patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex (the portion of
the brain behind the forehead) show impaired moral judgment in
53
emotional dilemmas.
48

Id.
Id.
50
See Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI & TECH. 27, 34-35
(2010) (describing the birth of “neurolaw.”).
51
See generally Stephan Hamann & Carla L. Harenski, Neural Correlates of Regulating
Negative Emotions Related to Moral Violations, 30 NEUROIMAGE 313 (2006).
52
Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and
Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOCIAL COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 203, 207 (2006).
53
Elisa Ciaramelli et al., Selective Deficit in Personal Moral Judgment Following
Damage to Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 2 SOCIAL COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE
49
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In addition to moral judgments, neural corollaries of other aspects
of human cognition have been found that may likewise affect our
theories of punishment, most notably that of intention. In 2004,
researchers found that certain parts of the motor cortex and prefrontal
54
cortex are triggered when individuals engage in intentional activities.
In the future, it is conceivable that defendants will voluntarily undergo
brain scanning in order to measure if the areas of the brain that are
known to deal with the formation of intent are functioning at the level
expected for a healthy individual. If a defendant’s scan turns out to be
“abnormal,” how should this affect the punishment and sentencing of
the individual?
The aforementioned findings pose a difficult question for those
who view punishment by the legal system as retributivist in nature.
More specifically, such findings may call into question whether society
is justified in punishing the behavior of an individual when the part of
their brain governing intent is shown to function abnormally. If the
neural machinery of moral judgments and intent are compromised due
to a brain injury or defect, larger questions about that individual’s
blameworthiness arise. If neuroscience undercuts the ability to assign
blame to certain individual actions, the retributivist theory of
punishment may be greatly attenuated. In turn, some commentators are
the theorizing that fMRI research could have profound changes on the
55
sentencing of individuals.
The far-reaching impact of neuroscience findings should prompt
the FTC to aggressively regulate fMRI marketing for improper usage.
Failure to regulate the marketing of such products could contribute to a
broad acceptance by judges and juries of the claims by companies like
No Lie MRI and Cephos. Given that judges and juries have a
tremendous capacity to influence the inner-workings of our justice
system, the FTC should act to prevent such a scenario from unraveling.
NEUROSCIENCE 84 (2007); Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex
Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments, 446 NATURE 908 (2007).
54
John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17
CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007); Hakwan C. Lau et al., Attention to Intention, 303 SCIENCE
1208, 1208-10 (2004). .
55
See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not. Responsibility But
Treatment, 56 KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1003-1104 (2008) (“I, too, believe that advances in
neuroscience will change, dramatically, the criminal justice system… [W]e may see major
changes in how crimes are investigated, in how trials are conducted, in how sentencing
decisions are reached, and in what kinds of sentences are imposed.”).
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IV. THE FTC FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICE DETERMINATIONS
This section will describe the FTC’s current policy with respect to
deceptive advertising. The FTC’s policy is particularly helpful because
many states have adopted its general framework for approaching
deceptive marketing.
A.

History of the FTC and the FTC Act

The Federal Trade Communications Act (hereinafter “FTC Act”)
56
empowered the FTC to regulate a broad variety of trade practices.
However, the FTC did not always possess such broad authority. As
enacted in 1914, the FTC was only empowered to “prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
57
competition in commerce.” At this point, the FTC was not charged
58
with preventing deceptive practices. Eventually, the FTC Act would
broaden its focus to include regulation of “unfair methods.”
59
This broadening began with the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act which
amended Section Five of the FTC Act, declaring deceptive practices in
commerce to be illegal, and empowering the FTC to challenge both
60
“unfair,” as well as “deceptive” trade practices. The Wheeler-Lea Act
also provided the FTC with the authority to take action against the false
61
advertising of foods, drugs, and cosmetics. This law also specifically
provides the FTC with the authority to issue preliminary injunctions
62
against such advertisements.
Though Section Five of the FTC Act became — and still is — the
primary tool by which actions are brought alleging deceptive acts, the
original Act was a blunt instrument, generally approaching both
63
“unfair” and “deceptive” practices under a single standard. The
precision of FTC regulations was later sharpened somewhat by case law
56

15 U.S.C. § 41 (2009).
Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5(a), 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)).
58
See generally id.
59
Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)).
60
Id.
61
Id. at ch. 49, §§ 4-5, 52 Stat. 111, 114 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-57).
62
Id.
63
See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Sterling Drug, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963).
57
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that produced a refined standard, which focused on whether or not the
64
practice in question had the “tendency and capacity” to mislead. In the
65
1965 seminal case F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., the Supreme
Court articulated the standard for deceptive practices, opining that, “the
misrepresentation of any fact, so long as it materially induces a
66
purchaser’s decision to buy, is a deception prohibited by § 5.”
Nonetheless, as in 1914, the FTC Act remained silent as to what
exactly “unfair” or “deceptive” meant in the context of the Act. This
67
vagueness led to criticism of the FTC. In response to such criticism,
the FTC issued a letter to Congress in 1984 — known as the “Deception
Statement” — which sought to clarify the FTC’s policy on deceptive
68
trade practices.
However, the Deception Statement qua letter had no actual legal
authority. The legal authority of the policy set forth in the Deception
Statement was augmented when the FTC included the entirety of the
letter in its appendix to the FTC’s decision in In re Cliffdale
69
Associates. By including the Deception Statement in Cliffdale
Associates, the Deception Statement “became the legal standard which
70
the Commission had to apply in all future deception cases.”
Federal courts have also adopted the policy explicated in the
71
Deception Statement. Furthermore, the federal judiciary is highly
72
deferential to the Commission’s findings in general. Additionally, the
Deception Statement has been “widely used as guidance in the

64
See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir.
1994); U.S. Retail Credit Ass’n v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 212, 221-22 (4th Cir. 1962).
65
F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
66
Id. at 387 (emphasis in original).
67
See Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47-89
(1969).
68
In 1980 the FTC published an “Unfairness Statement” clarifying the term “unfair
practices,” but this is outside the scope of this paper. In re Int’l Harvester Corp., 104 F.T.C.
949, 1070 app. n.41 (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm.
69
In re Cliffdale Assoc. Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. (1984) [hereinafter “Deception
Statement”].
70
Amrep Corp. v. F.T.C., 768 F.2d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1985).
71
See F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp. 33 F.3d 1088, 1096 n.19 (9th Cir. 1994); U.S. v.
Locascio, 357 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
72
Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1976); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, 1384
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987)).
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73

interpretation of state consumer protection statutes. . . .”
Procedurally, once the Commission decides to take action against a
party, it has two options. Part Three of the FTC Rules of Practice allows
74
the FTC to file a claim for administrative adjudication. Alternatively,
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act allows the Commission to file a complaint
75
in federal court. However, the focus has begun to shift to the federal
76
courts as the primary means of adjudication.
B.

The Deception Statement

1.

Generally

To apply the FTC’s policy on deceptive trade practices to the
advertisements for cutting-edge neuroscience products, it is first
necessary to discuss the self-imposed requirements that the FTC must
meet in order to bring a deceptive advertising claim. The Deception
Statement begins by describing what it believes to be the common
elements to all deceptive trade practices. Generally, the Commission
will find a practice to be deceptive if:
1. There is a representation, omission, or other practice,
2. That misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances,
77
3. To the consumer’s detriment.

The Commission supplements this standard by describing in detail
its different aspects.
2.

Representation, Omission, or Other Practice

The first requirement of a deceptive practice is a representation,
78
omission, or practice. The Deception Statement provides examples of
misleading and deceptive practices, including false oral or written
representations, misleading price claims, sales of hazardous or
73
Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer
Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
829, 848-49 (2006).
74
Commencement of Proceedings, FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings,
16 C.F.R.§3.11 (2010).
75
15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2010); 16 C.F.R. § 3.2 (2010).
76
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 41-42 (2004).
77
See Deception Statement, supra note 69, at 183.
78
Id. at 170.
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systematically defective products or services without adequate
disclosures, failure to disclose information regarding pyramid sales, use
of bait and switch techniques, failure to perform promised services, and
79
failure to meet warranty obligations. The Commission further states
that a misrepresentation can be either an express or implied statement
80
contrary to fact. The FTC has defined an “express claim” as a claim
81
literally made in the advertisement. For example, “ABC Mouthwash
82
prevents colds” is an express claim that the product will prevent colds.
An implied claim, as defined by the FTC, is a claim made indirectly or
83
by inference. For example, an advertisement stating that “ABC
Mouthwash kills the germs that cause colds” contains an implied claim
84
that the product will prevent colds. With respect to omissions, the
Commission states that an omission may be considered a
misrepresentation if qualifying information necessary to prevent a
practice, claim, representation, or reasonable expectation or belief from
85
being misleading is not disclosed.
3.

Misleading a Consumer Acting Reasonably

The second factor that the FTC investigates is the impact of the
practice in question from the perspective of the consumer acting
86
reasonably under the circumstances. If the representation or practice
affects or is directed primarily to a particular group, the FTC examines
87
reasonableness from the perspective of that group. Generally, the FTC
will find deception if the average consumer would be deceived, if a
significant number of consumers would be misled, or if the
advertisement is aimed at a particularly vulnerable audience that is

79

Id..
Id.
81
Frequently Asked Advertising Questions: A Guide for Small Business, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/adv/bus35.shtm (last visited Nov. 29,
2010).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
See Deception Statement, supra note 69 at 170. See In re Int’l Harvester Corp., 104
F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984) (making clear that the omission of information about a product may
be deceptive in certain circumstances).
86
See Deception Statement, supra note 69 at 171.
87
Id.
80
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88

likely to be misled.
4.

Materiality Requirement

The third factor — the most complex of the three — asks whether
89
or not the representation, omission, or practice is “material” in nature.
As the FTC describes:
The basic question [concerning the materiality requirement] is
whether the act or practice is likely to affect the consumer’s conduct
or decision with regard to a product or service. If so, the practice is
material, and consumer injury is likely, because consumers are likely
to have chosen differently but for the deception. In many instances,
materiality, and hence injury, can be presumed from the nature of the
practice. In other instances, evidence of materiality may be
90
necessary.

With respect to the materiality of a representation, omission, or
practice, the FTC “will not generally require extrinsic evidence
91
concerning the materiality of a challenged claim.” Furthermore, courts
have upheld agency decisions even in light of expert testimony that
92
there was no deception of individual consumers. In both In re
Thompson Medical Co. and Kraft v. F.T.C., the Commission concluded
that, with respect to extrinsic evidence:
1. Express claims will not require extrinsic proof on the
meaning of the advertisement,
2. Obvious implied claims, i.e. those that can be reasonably
inferred from the express claims, no extrinsic proof will be
required, though it will be considered if available; and
3. Implied claims that cannot be deciphered from examining
93
the face of the ad will require some type of intrinsic proof.

5.

Materiality Does Not Require Intent to Deceive

The Commission has maintained that scienter is not required for a
88
DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 727
(Thomson West 2008 Ed.).
89
See Deception Statement, supra note 69 at 171.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 192-93.
92
See Bantam Books, Inc. v. F.T.C., 275 F.2d 680, 682 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 819 (1960).
93
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 88, at 768-69 (citing Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970
F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984)).
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94

finding of deception. This policy has been affirmed in a number of
decisions, including F.T.C. v. Verity International, Ltd., where the court
stated that “deception need not be made with intent to deceive; it is
enough that the representations or practices were likely to mislead
95
consumers acting reasonably.” The rationale for not requiring scienter
is explicated in F.T.C. v. Freecom Communications, where the court
found that Section Five of the FTC Act is meant to protect the
consumer, thus warranting a focus on how the acts or practices will
96
affect the consumer, not on the intent of the defendant. Since
materially deceptive claims under the FTC Act are presumed as a matter
of law to cause injury to consumers, the FTC is not obligated to proffer
97
evidence of the risk of injury. Thus, the FTC’s framework bears a
striking similarity to statutes imposing strict liability.
6.

Materiality May At Times Be Presumed, Even Without Injury

Though certain parts of the Deception Statement appear to create a
requirement of actual consumer injury, the Commission has not
98
required actual injury for a finding of materiality. The Deception
Statement itself disavows the injury requirement, affirming previous
99
Commission decisions that abandoned such a requirement. From the
Deception Statement, FTC decisions, and case law, it is clear that there
are four circumstances where the Commission will presume materiality.
Specifically, materiality will be presumed where the alleged violator:
1. Made an expressly false claim;
2. Should have known that the consumer needs information
that was not disclosed;

94

F.T.C. v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2005).
F.T.C. v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1278 (2007).
96
F.T.C. v. Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d 1192, 1202, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005).
97
See In re N. Am. Philips Corp., 111 F.T.C. 150 (1988); In re Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 113
F.T.C. 146, 243 (1986).
98
See F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
99
In re Cliffdale Assoc. Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 152 (1984) (citing F.T.C. v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 387 (1965); In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 368
(1981), aff’d as modified, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982) (defining materiality to include
anything that affects purchasing decision, and holding that materiality will be found if postpurchase use of product is affected by advertisement); In re Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 87 F.T.C.
1184, 1229 (1976), aff’d, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978) (disavowing any requirement of a
specific finding that actual injury has occurred)).
95
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3. Intended an implied claim; or
4. Made a claim in any of several areas generally established as
relevant to consumers, including the purpose of the product
or service at issue; its efficacy, quality or performance;
100
health or safety issues; cost; durability; or a warranty.

In International Harvester, the FTC explained that “. . .implied
claims are material if they pertain to the central characteristics of the
101
product, such as its safety, cost, or fitness for the purposes sold.” The
rationale for abandoning actual injury is explained in Freecom
Communications, where the Court stated that “[n]either proof of
consumer reliance nor consumer injury is necessary to establish a §
5violation . . .Otherwise the law would preclude the FTC from taking
preemptive action against those responsible for deceptive acts or
102
practices, contrary to § 5’sprophylactic purpose.”
The FTC has linked deception by omission to materiality, stating
that, “depending on the facts, information pertaining to the central
103
characteristics of the product or service will be presumed material.”
The Commission listed information dealing with the product’s purpose
104
and efficacy as being material.
In Kraft, Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
the Commission was justified in finding that the claims in Kraft’s
advertisements were material if they were deemed to be important to
105
consumers and would influence the consumer’s purchasing decisions.
In Kraft, the Commission found that the consumer had significant health
concerns that were triggered by Kraft’s claim that their cheese slices
106
were superior to imitation slices in terms of their calcium content. The
court therefore ruled that the Commission properly inferred that Kraft’s
107
claims of superiority were material. The court also affirmed the
108
Commission’s finding that the advertisement was deceptive.
In F.T.C. v. QT, Inc, a Federal District Court considered whether a
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 76, at 13.
In re Int’l Harvester, Corp., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1056-57 (1984).
F.T.C. v Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005).
See Deception Statement, supra note 69, at 190.
Id.
Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 324.
Id.
Id. at 322.
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bracelet advertisement, which claimed to provide immediate pain relief,
109
was a deceptive marketing activity. The manufacturer claimed in an
advertisement that the bracelet provided immediate, significant, or
110
complete pain relief, and that scientific tests proved its pain relief
111
claims. The Court upheld the FTC’s ruling that the advertisement’s
claim was material, and that the advertisement was likely to mislead
112
reasonable consumers. To understand both the FTC and the courts’
rulings in both Kraft and QT, it is necessary to discuss the substantiation
requirement imposed on advertisers when they make claims like the one
at issue in QT.
7.

Substantiation Policy

The FTC’s Deception Statement and the related case law provide
general guidance for approaching deceptive advertising issues. Even if
the first and third requirements of the deception statement are satisfied,
(i.e. the requirement that the advertiser make a representation or
omission and that such representation is material) the question of
whether the advertisement is likely to mislead the consumer may still be
difficult to answer. In order to determine whether an advertisement is
likely to mislead a consumer, the FTC has employed two tools: the
113
“falsity theory” and the “reasonable basis” theory. The falsity theory
requires that the FTC prove that the claims made in the advertisement
114
are demonstrably false, and the burden of proof is on the FTC. The
reasonable basis theory requires that advertisers have a “reasonable
basis” for any express or implied claims that their advertisement
115
conveys. This policy was affirmed in the FTC’s Statement on
Advertising Substantiation, which states that “failure to possess and rely
upon a reasonable basis for objective claims constitutes an unfair and
deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade

109

F.T.C. v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 512 F.3d 858
(7th Cir. 2008).
110
Id. at 960.
111
Id. at 961-62.
112
Id. at 975.
113
See F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations
omitted).
114
See id.
115
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 695 F.2d 681, 693 (3d Cir. 1982).
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116

Commission Act.”
Initially, the FTC’s rationale for requiring substantiation was that
unsubstantiated claims unfairly require the consumer to gamble on
whether the product will meet the expectations conveyed by the
117
advertisement. However, the FTC’s current favored rationale for the
substantiation requirement is that unsubstantiated claims are inherently
118
deceiving. The FTC’s reasoning is that, because the advertiser has not
disclosed a material fact, the affirmative representation lacks the
119
support that would be presumed absent some qualification.
For example, the FTC held that Firestone Tire Company’s
blanketed claims that its tire “stops 25% quicker” needed to be
120
sufficiently substantiated by tests on a variety of road conditions.
Since Firestone had only tested its tires in one set of conditions, the
FTC ruled that the company did not have a reasonable basis to
121
substantiate its claim. Likewise, in QT, the defendant company was
required to have a “reasonable basis” for their claim that the bracelet
122
would provide pain relief to the wearer. Since QT, Inc. did not have
the appropriate evidence to back up its claim, the FTC found that the
123
unsubstantiated claims would likely mislead consumers. As such, an
advertiser’s failure to have a reasonable basis for an advertisement’s
claims at the time the claims are made renders the advertising
124
deceptive.
With respect to the level of substantiation required, the advertiser
must have at least the level of support that it explicitly claims in its
advertisements, and will also be required to provide support for any
125
implied claims. If an advertisement makes express representations
116

49 Fed. Reg. 30, 999 (Aug 2, 1984), reprinted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 39,060,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm.
117
See In re Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 67-69 (1972).
118
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 695 F.2d at 692.
119
Id.
120
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 418 (1972).
121
Id. at 427.
122
F.T.C. v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
123
Id. at 965.
124
See Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 773-774 (opining that the advertisements
were deceptive because Thompson did not have a reasonable basis to back up the claims in
its advertisement).
125
49 Fed. Reg. 30, 999 (Aug 2, 1984), reprinted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 39,060,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm.
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regarding the level of substantiation, (e.g. “according to clinical studies”
or “laboratory testing proves”) the FTC will require that the advertiser
126
substantiate such claims. An advertiser claiming that a scientific
consensus exists on a certain issue will be required to provide evidence
of such a consensus. Advertisements claiming that “research
proves . . .” or that “laboratory science has perfected . . .” will need to
127
be substantiated by competent scientific proof.
In practice, FTC substantiation cases generally fall into two main
categories: claims regarding health and safety, and claims regarding a
128
product’s efficacy. Both require competent and reliable evidence such
as research, studies, or other evidence from professionals in the relative
area, conducted and evaluated by qualified individuals using generally
129
accepted procedures.
Of particular importance to fMRI lie detection is the FTC’s policy
that an advertisement may be deemed deceptive if there are unresolved
scientific questions relevant to the advertisement’s claim that it omits or
130
131
ignores. In National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. F.T.C., the
132
Seventh Circuit upheld the FTC’s finding of deceptive advertising.
The FTC had found that the Egg Commission’s advertising claim that
there was “no evidence” that eggs contribute to heart disease was
133
deceptive. Because credible scientific studies did not support the
contention that egg consumption posed no health risk, but rather that
credible scientific evidence linked egg consumption to an increased risk
of cardiovascular disease, the FTC concluded that there was no
reasonable basis for the Egg Commission’s claims, consequently ruling
134
them deceptive. For respondents to make no mention of the scientific
126
127
128

In re Removatron Int’l Corp, 111 F.T.C. 206, 297 (1985).
Id. at 298; In re Porter & Dietsch, 90 F.T.C. 770, 865 (1977).
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 9

(2009).
129

See In re Novartis Corp., 127 F.T.C. 580, 670 (1996), aff’d, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir.

1996).
130

In re Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 193 (1976), enforced as
modified, 570 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that the National Commission on Egg
Nutrition cannot ignore the fact that many scientists cite studies demonstrating that the
ingestion of eggs may increase heart disease).
131
Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. F.T.C., 570 F.2d 157, 165 (7th Cir. 1977).
132
Id.
133
In re Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C.at 187-190.
134
Id.

COHEN (DO NOT DELETE)

180

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

12/6/2010 12:08 PM

Vol. 35:1

controversy surrounding this issue was, as the Court stated, patently
135
false and misleading.
Furthermore, a determination of the level of substantiation that an
136
advertiser must have is made on a case-by-case basis. The FTC
considers “the type of claim, the product, the consequences of a false
claim, the benefits of a truthful claim, the cost of developing
substantiation for the claim, and the amount of substantiation experts in
the field believe is reasonable” in order to determine what comprises a
137
reasonable basis.
V.

THE CLAIMS

Both No Lie MRI and Cephos make claims regarding the science
behind fMRI, the legal admissibility of fMRI, the observer
independence of fMRI and the scientific community’s support of fMRIbased lie detection. These claims will be discussed in turn. This Note
will then analyze the claims under the FTC’s approach to deceptive
advertising as discussed in Part IV.
A.

Claims Regarding the State of fMRI-based Lie Detection

Both No Lie MRI and Cephos make very strong claims that their
fMRI technology can detect deception. No Lie MRI claims that “[t]he
technology used by No Lie MRI represents the first and only direct
138
measure of truth verification and lie detection in human history!”
Likewise, Cephos claims that it has developed “the latest, most
scientifically advanced, brain imaging techniques for scientifically
139
accurate lie detection.”
The companies’ representations fall into a category of
representation that the FTC will presume to be material: those
pertaining to the efficacy of the product. Both companies bill
themselves as providing “truth verification” fMRI services. For
example, No Lie MRI states that it provides “unbiased methods for the

135

Id.
49 Fed. Reg. 30, 999 (Aug 2, 1984), reprinted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 39,060,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm.
137
Id.
138
NO LIE MRI, supra note 6.
139
CEPHOS CORP., supra note 6.
136
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140

detection of deception and other information stored in the brain”
Furthermore, No Lie MRI claims to utilize techniques that “bypass
conscious cognitive processing” by measuring “the activity of the
central nervous system (brain and spinal cord) rather than the peripheral
141
nervous system (as polygraph testing does).” These statements appear
directly above an fMRI image of the brain and directly to the left of a
photograph of a sophisticated-looking piece of medical imaging
142
equipment that is presumably an fMRI machine. This fMRI brain
image is annotated, with certain parts of the brain labeled as “lie” areas
143
while another labeled as “truth” areas. Cephos is no less zealous in its
declaration of lie detection capabilities. On its website’s landing page,
Cephos states that “[t]he source of lying is in the brain — this is what
Cephos measures with our truth verification brain imaging service using
fMRI technology. We provide independent, scientific validation that
144
someone is telling the truth.”
B.

Claims Regarding Legal Admissibility

Both Cephos and No Lie MRI make an additional claim regarding
the purpose of their services: to be used in a court of law. Cephos states
that “[w]e have offered expert testimony and have presented fMRI
145
evidence in court” and that “Cephos fMRI lie detection evidence is
146
likely admissible in court.” Likewise, No Lie MRI states that their
results “could be used in a similar manner to DNA testing by adding the
verification of an individual’s mental record. It would also potentially
be possible for a witness to validate his or her own statements to the
147
court.”

140

NO LIE MRI, supra note 6.
Id.
142
See id.
143
See Appendix 3 for a screenshot of the website.
144
The Technology Behind Lie Detection, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.
com/lie-detection/index.php#lie (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
145
Id.
146
fMRI Testing & Legal Admissibility, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/liedetection/index.php#admissibility (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
147
Customers – Lawyers, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/customers/Lawyers.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
141
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Claims Regarding Observer Independence and Automation

Both companies expressly claim that their services are entirely
processed by computers, with no human intervention. Cephos claims
that “[a]ll ‘readings’ are performed by computers; thus, no human
148
interpretations are required.” Likewise, No Lie MRI states that its
offering is fully automated and observer independent and therefore
149
objective. Claims of computer automation and observer independence
are important representations, for such assertions portray the technology
as being able to objectively detect deception without the need for human
intervention.
D.

Claims Regarding Scientific Credibility and Support

Furthermore, both companies claim that the scientific community
backs their fMRI lie detection series. Specifically, No Lie MRI lists a
150
“Scientific Board” comprised of three university professors. No Lie
151
MRI also has a separate page listing scientific publications. Cephos
claims that a host of academic groups, including those at Harvard,
Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania, have all concluded that
152
fMRI technology can distinguish between lies and truth.
VI. ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS UNDER FTC DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING PRINCIPLES
A. Companies’ Claims That Their Technology Can Directly
Detect Deception May be False and Unsubstantiated
The FTC should have a relatively easy time proving that the
companies have no substantiation for their claims that they can directly
detect deception. As discussed above, current fMRI technology does not

148

Working with Cephos, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/liedetection/index.php#working (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
149
Product Overview, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/products/Overview.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2010).
150
Scientific Board, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/aboutUs/ScienceBoard.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2010).
151
Scientific Publications, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/pressNPubs/Publications
.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
152
fMRI Testing and Legal Admissibility, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.
com/lie-detection/index.php#admissibility (last visited Dec. 4, 2010).
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153

directly measure the neuronal activity of the brain. In other words,
fMRI technology does not measure the firing of neurons in the brain.
Rather, as used in brain imaging, fMRI measures changes in blood flow
154
to the brain. This necessarily requires that any results gleaned from
155
fMRI data depend on a chain of inferences.
Specifically, this chain of inferences requires an initial threshold
determination of what constitutes the BOLD data that will be
156
represented on the fMRI image. The boundaries for what is or is not
depicted in fMRI images are determined by “hemodynamic
157
modeling.” The BOLD signal is part of this modeling, and is
represented in a complex statistical algorithm where certain variables
158
must be specified. In coming to a conclusion about what the image
represents, we necessarily infer that BOLD data accurately represents
increased neuronal activity. A second inference is required, namely that
the neuronal activity depicted by the BOLD data is relevant to
understanding and explaining deceptive brain states. A third inference
requires us to conclude that a reading indicating a deceptive brain state
is itself sufficient to establish that the subject has objectively lied.
Arguably, the third inference is not required. This is because fMRI may
be used to show a lack of activation in a certain area, that is, an area

153

See supra Part II.B.
See id. (discussing how fMRI measures changes in blood flow which are believed to
indicate neural activity).
155
Much of the inspiration for the explication, as well as the diagram in Appendix 4 is
taken from Neal Feigenson’s article describing what he believes is the chain of inferences
underlying fMRI scans. See Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On
the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT 233, 239 (2006).
However, my chain of inferences is different. Feigenson describes the first step as being an
inference, which I believe is misleading. On an abstract level, apart from how the
technology is applied across studies, a threshold determination is required. Additionally, I
believe that it is crucial to include the final inference regarding the finding of fact that is the
ultimate step for anyone considering fMRI data in the legal context.
156
See Appendix 4 for a chart of the inferences.
157
See generally RICHARD S. J. FRACKOWIAK ET AL., HUMAN BRAIN FUNCTION (2d ed.
2003).
158
K.J. Friston et al., Nonlinear Responses in fMRI: The Balloon Model, Volterra
Kernels, and Other Hemodynamic,12 NEUROIMAGE, 466, 469 (2000). “The BOLD signal y t
= λ v q E is taken to be a static nonlinear function of normalised venous [where] volume (v),
normalised total deoxyhaemoglobin voxel content (q), and resting net oxygen extraction
fraction by the capillary bed (E0).” Friston goes on to discuss how certain variables must be
provided in the function. Id.
154
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159

showing a deficit of activity. However, both fMRI-based lie detection
companies market their products as if an objective determination can be
made based on the presence of neuronal activity represented by
160
increased blood flow.
As is apparent from the chain of inferences above, it is unlikely
that fMRI data directly measures deception. No Lie MRI does not make
an effort to convey that fMRI technology indirectly measures brain
161
activity. Cephos does explain that its service is measuring blood flow,
162
but nevertheless claims that it is a direct detection of deception. As the
FTC has made clear in previous cases, if there is a representation that
can be interpreted in both a misleading way and a non-misleading way,
163
the advertiser is found to be deceptive. As the representations by both
companies that they can directly detect deception are false, they
therefore violate FTC regulations.
B.

No Reasonable Basis for Truth Verification Claims

Both companies make express representations about the accuracy
of their services and refer to their use of fMRI technology as being able
164
to “verify” the truthfulness of statements. The use of the word
159
For example, functional neuroimaging could theoretically be used to demonstrate the
likelihood of a subject having a certain cognitive deficit. See generally Francesca Caramia et
al., Cognitive deficits in multiple sclerosis: a review of functional MRI studies,
NEUROLOGICAL SCIENCES (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.springerlink.com/content/
h064618280756578/fulltext.html.
160
See supra Part V.
161
How an MRI Works, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/products/HowMRIWorks.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2010). Instead of explaining the science behind the technology, No Lie
MRI simply provides links to third party websites such as Wikipedia.org and
HowStuffWorks.com.
162
The Technology Behind Lie Detection, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com
/lie-detection/index.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2010) (stating that “[f]unctional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) is a type of specialized MRI scan that measures the changes in
blood flow related to neural activity in the brain or spinal cord,” but then stating “[t]he
source of lying is in the brain – this is what Cephos measures with our truth verification
brain imaging service using fMRI technology. We provide independent, scientific validation
that someone is telling the truth.”).
163
In re Jay Norris Corp., 91 F.T.C. 751, 836 (1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.
1979); In re National Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 185 (1976), enforced in part,
570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
164
The header of No Lie MRI’s website advertises “New Truth Verification
Technology.” See Appendix 3. Likewise, Cephos refers to its services as “lie detection/truth
verification.” Lie Detection, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/lie-detection/
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“verification” is an implicit representation of an accuracy rate of onehundred percent. This is particularly true in this context since the
service offered would be viewed by an ordinary consumer as being
scientific, and the phrase “verification” is in close proximity to a picture
165
of an fMRI scanner and fMRI brain scan images on the website. No
Lie MRI presumably attempts to qualify this statement by claiming that
their accuracy is over ninety percent effective and that it will soon be
166
ninety-nine percent effective. However, as discussed earlier, if a claim
is subject to two interpretations, one of which is misleading, and another
that is not, the advertisement will still be found to be deceptive as long
167
as it is likely to deceive.
Furthermore, it is not likely that either company can substantiate a
claim of ninety percent accuracy. Though researchers have reported the
ability to detect deception in the laboratory setting with a ninety percent
accuracy rate, the individuals tested are often small groups of
168
undergraduate college students. There do not appear to be studies on
169
the general population, or on individuals whose behavior has been
associated with morphological changes in brain structure, such as
170
recovering alcoholics or drug addicts. In fact, it is unclear whether the
studies’ results can be said to apply to older individuals who have
normal age-related changes in brain morphology. Without broader
studies in hand, it appears difficult, if not impossible, for either
index.php#lie (last visited Dec. 4, 2010).
165
See Appendix 3.
166
Product Overview, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/products/Overview.htm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2010).
167
In re Rodale Press, Inc., 71 F.T.C. 1184, 1237-38 (1967).
168
Daniel D. Langleben, Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects With Fast
Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262, 263 (2005).
169
See S.K.Z. Ihnen et al., Lack of Generalizability of Sex Differences in the fMRI
BOLD Activity Associated with Language Processing in Adults, 45 NEUROIMAGE 1020,
1031 (2009) (“Thus from both a cognitive neuroscience perspective and from the standpoint
of experimental design, it is important to recognize the possibility that sex differences may
exist in functional neuroimaging studies of language and other cognitive domains. It is
equally important, however, to recognize that conclusions about between-group differences
in fMRI studies should be made conservatively, acknowledging the possibility that
accounted variability may contaminate the data.”).
170
Thomas Wobrock et al., Effects of Abstinence on Brain Morphology in Alcoholism,
259 EUR. ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 143 (2009) (“In
conclusion this study confirms the hypothesis that alcoholism causes brain damages that are
partially reversible. It should be analyzed in further studies with larger sample sizes, if
complete brain regeneration is possible maintaining abstinence over a longer period.”).
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company to substantiate the general non-disclaimed representation that
they can verify truth.
An argument can also be proffered that a claim to verify truth
violates the falsity theory given our current understanding of how the
brain functions. Current neuroscience research leads to the conclusion
that a simple verification of truth is impossible given that scientists have
not found any “deception” neuron whose activity (or lack thereof)
would be observable by an fMRI scanner. Furthermore, neuroscience
demonstrates that the brain is remarkably “plastic,” that is, it is capable
of adaptive structural changes in response to external factors or
171
disease, as well as the capacity to co-opt other parts of the brain if
necessary. For example, studies have shown that in blind individuals,
areas of the visual cortex that are typically believed to deal with sight
172
are in fact activated when those individuals read Braille. This
plasticity introduces unpredictability and dynamism in the functional
roles of the parts of an individual’s brain.
There is no mention by No Lie MRI or Cephos on their respective
websites that they take into account this plasticity. Without evidence
that they have taken these characteristics of human brain function into
account, the companies’ ability to claim “truth verification” is severely
undermined. At the very least, both companies should discuss why these
characteristics of the human brain do not play a role in the “truth
verification” process. Without such a discussion, both companies would
likely lose an FTC challenge under the “reasonable basis” test described
173
supra. That is, the FTC would find the advertising of fMRI lie
detection to be deceptive, as it did in Firestone, if the companies do not
provide a reasonable basis for their truth verification claims.
C. Claim That Professionals Support fMRI as a Lie Detector Are
Unsubstantiated
Both companies make express claims that their scans can be used

171
See J.D. Bremmer et al., Structural and Functional Plasticity of the Human Brain in
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 167 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RES. 171 (2007).
172
N. Sadato et al., Activation of the Primary Visual Cortex by Braille Reading in Blind
Subjects, 380 NATURE 526, 526 (1996) (functional neuroimaging study demonstrating
activation of the visual cortex in blind individuals while reading Braille).
173
See supra Part IV.B.7.
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in court. Cephos specifically draws on the case of Roper v. Simmons
in its “The Technology Behind Lie Detects” section, describing that
“[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has used fMRIs to help determine when a
175
criminal is a juvenile versus an adult.” On their “Admissibility” page
they go on to state that:
The U.S. Supreme Court has received at least one amicus brief based
in part on brain scans in Roper v. Simmons to aid in the
determination of when a person may be tried as an adult. Therefore,
the Supreme Court and neuroscientists have supported the use of
176
fMRI in real-world settings.

It is clear that Cephos is making a representation that compares its
fMRI lie detection technology to the use of fMRI technology in the
studies submitted in Roper. The amicus brief submitted by the
American Psychological Association (hereinafter “APA”) did not,
however, claim that adolescents were having specific brain states based
on fMRI evidence. Rather, it focused on the morphological changes in
177
the adolescent’s brain as the adolescent develops. Cephos’ statement
is misleading as it clearly implies that, since the APA supported the use
of fMRI evidence as a mitigating factor in Roper, it necessarily supports
the use of fMRI technology for lie detection. As described above, the
FTC requires that an advertiser claiming that a scientific consensus
178
exists be able to substantiate that claim. Thus, the FTC will have a
strong argument against Cephos if it requests substantiation of the
179
claims that a scientific consensus exists on the use of fMRI evidence.
The likely failure of either company to substantiate the claims of
scientific consensus is underscored after taking into account what the
scientists who conducted the actual studies on fMRI-based lie detection
have said regarding the application of their findings. Writing in the
174

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
The Technology Behind Lie Detection, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/
lie-detection/index.php#lie (last visited Nov.26, 2010).
176
fMRI Testing & Legal Admissibility, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/liedetection/index.php#admissibility (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
177
Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 23, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2003) (No. 03-633).
178
See supra Part IV.B.7 (discussing F.T.C.’s Substantiation Policy).
179
Additionally, the logic that Cephos utilizes is inherently flawed. Simply because the
Supreme Court received an amicus brief from the APA does not therefore mean that the
Court supports the use of fMRI for lie detection. In fact, the Court did not mention fMRI
once in its opinion. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
175
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Journal of Behavioral Neuroscience, Dr. Andrew Kozel stated that his
fMRI-based study on deception “. . .was designed to identify brain
regions associated with deceptive answers versus truthful answers, not
to formally test the method as a means of lie detection. Subsequent
work will be needed to determine whether this technology can be used
to distinguish deceptive responses from truthful responses within
180
individuals.”
Furthermore, Dr. Daniel Langleben,the researcher
whose patent was purchased by No Lie MRI, has also expressed
skepticism, distinguishing between “. . . the researchers of deception
and the merchants of fMRI-based lie detection. While the
overwhelming majority of the former are recognized scientists, it would
181
be interesting to know more about the latter.” These statements from
the very researchers who studied the neural correlates of deception will
make it difficult for a company such as Cephos or No Lie MRI to
demonstrate that it has a reasonable basis for representing that a
scientific consensus exists regarding the application of fMRI-based lie
182
detection outside of the academic setting.
Because both companies make such direct claims regarding the
scientific community’s support of fMRI-based lie detection, the claims
will likely be considered express claims insofar as the Deception
183
Statement standard is concerned. Furthermore, because the support of
the scientific community speaks to the purpose or efficacy of the
services advertised, they will all be presumed to be material. The next
step is to determine if the claims satisfy the third requirement of the
Deception Statement, i.e., whether the statements would mislead a
reasonable consumer. This determination is accomplished by analyzing
whether the claims made by the companies violate the FTC’s policy as
described in its statement on advertising substantiation.

180
Frank Andrew Kozel et al., A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of
Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004).
181
D. Langleben & F. Dattillo, Commentary, The Future of Forensic Functional Brain
Imaging, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 502, 502-03 (2008).
182
Interestingly, Cephos claims that Dr. Kozel may be available for expert testimony on
behalf of the subject. The fMRI Testing Process, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephos
corp.com/lie-detection/index.php#testing (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
183
See supra Part IV.B.2.
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D. Claims That fMRI Readings Can be Used in Court Are
Contradicted by Recent Court Decisions
The companies’ claim that fMRI findings may be used in court
proceedings also violates the FTC Act. As mentioned previously, both
184
companies assert that their scans can be used as evidence. Because
these claims concern the efficacy of what they are selling, they will be
185
deemed material. Thus, the remaining question will be whether their
claims are likely to deceive. The FTC will have a strong argument that
186
such claims are deceptive under a reasonable basis theory. Under that
approach, the FTC could argue that both companies do not have a
reasonable basis upon which to base their claims that fMRI-based lie
detection is currently admissible in court.
The FTC could support this argument by showing that fMRI
findings are unable to pass either of the two tests that are used to
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence: the Daubert and Frye
tests. Federal courts, and some state courts, use the Daubert test to
determine whether scientific evidence should be admissible, whereas
other states, including California, New York, and New Jersey, use the
187
traditional Frye test. Recent cases demonstrate that the FTC could
prevail under either test.
The Daubert test was formulated by the Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to determine whether scientific
evidence was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Federal Rules of
Evidence – most notably Rule 702 which governs testimony by
188
experts. When evaluating scientific evidence under the Daubert test, a
judge should consider what have come to be known as the Daubert
factors, namely:
1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested and has been
subject to testing
2. Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer
review and publication
3. The known or potential error rate of the methods used and
184

See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.A.
186
See supra Part IV.B.7
187
See Maxine D. Goodman, A Hedgehog on the Witness Stand – What’s the Big Idea?:
The Challenges of Using Daubert to Assess Social Science and Nonscientific Testimony, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 635, 683 n. 36 (2010).
188
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
185
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the existence of standards controlling the operation of the
technique; and
4. Whether the method or theory has been generally accepted
189
by the scientific community.

In United States v. Semrau, a U.S. Magistrate Judge in Tennessee
took issue with the last two factors in a case involving fMRI evidence.
190
Here, the defendant physician owned corporations that contracted
with psychiatrists to provide mental health services to patients in
191
nursing homes. The United States charged Dr. Semrau with engaging
in a scheme to defraud Medicare, Medicaid, and other benefit programs
192
by submitting false and fraudulent claims. The Court held a Daubert
hearing after the government moved to exclude the expert testimony of
Dr. Steven Laken, President and CEO of Cephos, who intended to
testify for the defense on the findings of Dr. Semrau’s fMRI study
193
conducted by Cephos.
With respect to the third Daubert factor — that the operation of the
technique has a known or potential error rate as well as the existence of
standards surrounding the technique’s use — the court found fMRI194
based lie detection deficient. The court opined that there presently
exists no “real life” error rate for fMRI-based lie detection outside of
195
the laboratory setting. On the second part of the third factor,
concerning the existence and maintenance of standards, the court
concluded that no such standards exist, notwithstanding the fact that Dr.
Laken of Cephos testified as to the protocols and standards that he uses
196
for his own exams. Without any “real life” error rates or any standards
governing fMRI-based lie detection, the court held that the fMRI
197
evidence failed the third Daubert prong. The court also found that
198
fMRI-based lie detection failed the fourth prong. Citing a string of
expert opinions on the inapplicability of fMRI-based lie detection to
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id. at 593-94.
United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074 M1/P (W.D. Tenn. May 31, 2010).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 27.
Semrau, No. 07-10074 M1/P, at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
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real-world lie detection, the court concluded that the technology has not
199
garnered general acceptance in the scientific community. Accordingly,
the magistrate recommended exclusion of this testimonial evidence.
The FTC could also successfully argue that the companies have no
reasonable basis for a claim of admissibility in jurisdictions that apply
the Frye test. The Frye test arose from United States v. Frye, a 1923
decision concerning whether measures of blood pressure could be
200
admitted as proof of deception. The Frye test stands for the
proposition that scientific evidence is inadmissible unless the technique
is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific
201
community.
202
In Wilson v Corestaff Services, a New York state court, upon a
motion in limine, opined that current fMRI data fails Frye’s “general
203
acceptance” test. In Wilson, the plaintiff sought to introduce fMRIbased lie detection evidence in order to bolster the credibility of a key
204
witness in her case against a staffing agency. In addition to the doubts
that the court expressed about admitting expert testimony to bolster the
credibility of a fact witness, it nevertheless found that such evidence
205
fails the Frye test. The court stated that “even a cursory review of the
scientific literature demonstrates that the plaintiff is unable to establish
that the use of the fMRI test to determine truthfulness or deceit is
206
accepted as reliable in the scientific community.”
In light of both Semrau and Wilson, No Lie MRI and Cephos lack
a reasonable basis for their claims that the fMRI studies they conduct
are admissible in court. Until fMRI-based lie detection findings are
admitted, the continued claims of legal admissibility by both companies
should be considered a deceptive practice under the FTC Act.
E.

Claims of Computer Automation are Deceptive

As discussed in Part V.C, both companies claim that humans do
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id. at 1014.
Wilson v Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S. 2d 639, 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
Id. at 642.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 642.
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not interpret their scans, but are instead analyzed by computers. The
FTC can challenge these claims under either the falsity theory or the
substantiation requirement. With respect to a challenge under the falsity
theory, the FTC could prove that, at some level, a human being must
program the fMRI’s computer software to interpret a certain BOLD
threshold of activity as a trigger to a finding of “deception.” This is
precisely what must be done when creating the hemodynamic models
207
that interpret the fMRI data. This determination is critical given that
one threshold level will produce an fMRI image that shows activation
(i.e. a colored region of the scan) whereas a different threshold may not.
Under the reasonableness theory, the FTC could also request that the
companies substantiate their claim that no human determination of what
constitutes a lie is used. Because of the inherent human interaction in
setting the BOLD threshold activity, the FTC is likely to prevail under
either theory.
VII. THE FTC SHOULD SEEK TO “FENCE-IN” FMRI LIE
DETECTION COMPANIES
Since it is likely that various claims of No Lie MRI and Cephos
violate deceptive trade practice laws, the next question that must be
answered is how the FTC should seek to remedy the situation.
Considering the fact that both companies market their services to
individuals, lawyers, corporations, and the government, the remedy
provided should be strong enough to prevent the deception of such
marketing to each of those consumer groups. A serious restriction on
such marketing is also warranted because the truth of the claims made
by these companies can not be readily determined by the consumers, a
fact that the FTC has previously used as a reason to impose serious
208
marketing restrictions on violators.
Section 5(b) of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to issue cease and
desist orders that prohibit a continuation of any practices found to be
209
deceptive. These requirements can go beyond prohibiting the precise
207

See supra Part VI.A (discussing hemodynamic modeling).
See In re Thompson Medical Corp., 102 F.T.C. 648, 834 (1984) (discussing how the
seriousness of the violation is affected by the consumers’ ability to judge the truth or falsity
of the claims, which was compounded here by Thompson’s deliberateness in making such
statements).
209
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2010). See generally F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 39293 (1959).
208
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conduct at issue, and can “fence in” the company from engaging in
210
similar kinds of deceptive advertising. The principal factor for a court
reviewing a fencing-in order is whether the order bears a “reasonable
211
relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.” In a recent decision,
the FTC more specifically noted three factors that it will look at in
examining a fencing in order, including “(1) the seriousness and
deliberateness of the violation; (2) the ease with which the violation
may be transferred to other products; and (3) whether the respondent
212
has a history of prior violations.” FTC orders are not typically limited
to any particular product of a company but rather cover a specific
213
category or the entirety of products marketed by a company.
All three factors here warrant a fencing-in requirement. With
respect to the first factor, marketing fMRI-based lie detection in its
infant stage would be considered serious, as the marketing targets a
wide swath of the population, including individuals, corporations, as
well as the federal government. Moreover, the marketing by No Lie
MRI and Cephos continues even in the face of mounting evidence and
opinion that the technology is not ready for “prime time.”
Furthermore, the second factor is satisfied. Undoubtedly, both
companies will attempt to continue marketing their devices as newer
fMRI machines are created. However, as discussed previously, an
increase in, for example, the power of the fMRI machine, will not
necessarily cure many of its fatal flaws. Though neither company
necessarily has a history of violations at this point, the companies’
continued marketing of the products, as well as their media appearances
promoting their products, clearly tip the scale in terms of a strong
fencing-in requirement.
A fencing-in requirement would have to consist of a number of
provisions. Specifically, it would have to:
210

Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. at 392-93 (“One cannot generalize as to the proper scope of
these orders. It depends on the facts of each case and a judgment as to the extent to which a
particular violator should be fenced in…Where the episodes of misbranding have been so
extensive and so substantial in number as they were here, we think it permissible for the
Commission to conclude that like and related acts of misbranding should also be enjoined as
a prophylactic and preventive measure.”).
211
Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608, 612-113 (1946).
212
In re Telebrands, 140 F.T.C. 278, 334 (2005).
213
See F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1965) (“[W]e find no
defect in the provision of the order which prohibits respondents from engaging in similar
practices with respect to ‘any product’ they advertise. . . “).
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1. Prohibit both companies from using the phrase
“verification” in reference to their fMRI services;
2. Prohibit any representations that claim an absence of human
interaction or interpretation in the process of determining
deception;
3. Prohibit any representations that the scientific community
has formed a consensus in favor of using fMRI-based lie
detection.

These fencing-in provisions would allow the companies to
continue to offer the services, but would prevent them from marketing it
in a way that overstates their efficacy and acceptance in the scientific
community.
CONCLUSION
fMRI research yields extraordinary insight into what is arguably
the most complex system known to man: the human brain. However, the
powerful potential of fMRI to uncover our mental states is not without
concomitant tensions. Constitutional rights prohibiting selfincrimination and unwarranted search and seizure, issues pertaining to
privacy, as well as the potential application of fMRI lie detection by the
government for national security purposes, require us to be vigilant and
skeptical of the commercialization of fMRI technology. Unfortunately,
such commercialization is beginning to obtain a critical mass. Both No
Lie MRI and Cephos currently market to what amounts to the entire
U.S. population: individuals, corporations, lawyers and the state and
214
federal government. The development and commercialization of this
powerful technology has been followed by extraordinary media
coverage which has fostered a popular notion that fMRI technology can
215
“read your mind.” Both No Lie MRI and Cephos have leveraged this
popular notion of fMRI as a mind-reading device. However, the science
is simply not at the stage where fMRI lie detection should be marketed
as “truth verification.”
Marketing fMRI as such is both deceptive and dangerous, and it is
precisely the role of the FTC to prevent deceptive marketing of fMRI.

214

See CEPHOS CORP., supra note 6; NO LIE MRI, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Brooke Borel, Mind-Reading Tech May Not Be Far Off, POPULAR SCI.
(June 12, 2009, 4:15 PM), http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2009-06/mind-readingtech-way; 60 Minutes; Reading Your Mind (CBS television broadcast Jan. 4, 2009).
215
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There are persuasive arguments as to why fMRI technology has
powerful potential as a lie detector while others would argue that lie
detection via fMRI is probably impossible. Because the potential for
fMRI as a lie detector exists, and because of the immensely positive
applications that such technology would have, the FTC should not seek
to eliminate No Lie MRI and Cephos from advertising fMRI-based lie
detection. Rather, the FTC should recognize that both companies are in
violation of deceptive trade practices, and should require them to
advertise the technology within the bounds of the current state of the art.
VIII. APPENDIX 1216
The below images are from Daniel Langleben’s study which
required subjects to lie about the card they were holding.

216

Langleben, supra note 44.
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APPENDIX 3218

FRACKOWIAK, supra note 157, at 601.
NO LIE MRI, supra note 6.
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